Freedom Without Form: Liberal Abstraction and the Crisis of Humanity
The dominant modern understanding of freedom is increasingly framed not as the capacity for fulfilment, but as liberation from constraint. Freedom, in this register, is imagined as emancipation from limits—biological, moral, cultural, historical—so that the individual may define himself without reference to any given order. Constraint is recast as oppression, and authenticity is identified with the absence of obligation.¹ What is presented as liberation is, in fact, a profound re-description of the human person.
This conception marks a decisive break with earlier liberal thought. Classical liberalism, while rightly concerned to restrain tyranny and protect civil liberties, nevertheless assumed that human freedom operated within an objective moral and natural order. Liberty was not conceived as licence, but as freedom under law—law understood not merely as coercive command, but as rational order. Thinkers such as John Locke regarded liberty as inseparable from reason and from goods intrinsic to human nature.² Freedom was not the power to negate reality, but the ability to act rightly within it.
Modern liberalism does not usually repudiate this inheritance explicitly. Rather, it subtly alters the emphasis. Freedom is no longer primarily understood as the disciplined capacity to pursue the good, but as the preservation of maximal personal discretion. The classical tension between liberty as non-interference and liberty as self-mastery remains in name, but not in balance. The former is steadily privileged, while the latter is hollowed out. What emerges is a concept of freedom that retains the language of moral seriousness while quietly detaching itself from truth, teleology, and the givenness of human nature.³
Once freedom is severed from any objective account of reality, reality itself begins to appear as an obstacle. Biological sex, inherited culture, moral norms, and historical belonging are no longer perceived as formative conditions of human life, but as external impositions upon the will. The task of living is redefined. It is no longer the cultivation of virtue within limits, but the continual renegotiation of identity against them.⁴ Life becomes a project of resistance rather than reception.
This inversion has consequences far beyond political theory. It reshapes how individuals apprehend the world itself. Frustration is no longer interpreted as a summons to growth or adjustment, but as evidence of injustice. Limits cease to be occasions for discipline and become affronts to authenticity. The world is experienced less as something to be known and inhabited than as something to be contested, revised, or escaped. In this climate, the very notion of a stable human nature becomes suspect.⁵
The sociological and psychological effects of this abstraction are increasingly difficult to ignore. Cultures that place maximal emphasis on self-definition and minimal emphasis on inherited meaning exhibit marked rises in anxiety, depression, identity confusion, and mental instability. When the self is required to generate its own identity without reference to objective givens or durable relationships, failure becomes existential rather than circumstantial. The burden of absolute autonomy proves unsustainable, particularly for the young.⁶
These observations are reinforced by empirical anthropology and developmental psychology. Across cultures and historical contexts, human beings develop stable identities only within environments of structured communion—familial, sexual, and intergenerational. Evolutionary anthropology consistently identifies humans as an ultra-social species. Our psychological development depends upon kinship systems, sexual dimorphism, reciprocal obligation, and shared moral expectations. When these structures are weakened or rendered indeterminate, anxiety, dissociation, and identity disturbance rise rather than fall.⁷
Developmental psychology corroborates this picture at the level of individual formation. Decades of research demonstrate that predictable boundaries, enduring attachments, and clearly defined social roles are associated with resilience, self-regulation, and identity coherence. Environments marked by radical self-definition and relational instability, by contrast, correlate with heightened psychological distress. Constraint, far from inhibiting freedom, appears to be a precondition for its maturation.⁸
Clinical psychology and psychiatry further confirm the pattern. Diagnostic literature documents a marked rise in internalising disorders—particularly anxiety, depression, and identity-related distress—in societies shaped by expressive individualism and weakened inherited structure. These disorders are not evenly distributed across cultures. They are most prevalent in late-modern Western societies where identity is increasingly conceived as self-generated rather than received.⁹
Cross-cultural anthropology reinforces this conclusion by contrast. Societies with strong kinship systems, clear sexual differentiation, and stable ritual and moral structures consistently report lower levels of identity instability, even under conditions of material hardship. The assumption that liberation from constraint yields psychological wellbeing is therefore not a human universal, but a culturally specific—and increasingly falsified—hypothesis.¹⁰
At root, these phenomena arise from a defective anthropology. The human person is not an abstract will suspended in a vacuum, but an embodied, sexed, and historically situated being. As Aristotle observed long before the rise of liberal individualism, man is by nature a zoon politikon, whose flourishing depends upon participation in a concrete moral and cultural order.¹¹ Identity is not invented ex nihilo, but received through family, language, custom, and shared memory.
Biological sex belongs intrinsically to this order of givenness. In the natural-law tradition articulated by Thomas Aquinas, sexual difference is not a peripheral attribute, but integral to human embodiment, relationality, and generational continuity. Sex is ordered toward procreation, kinship, and the common good, shaping identity at the level of body, relation, and inheritance. Detachment from biological reality does not liberate the person; it abstracts him from the material conditions of human life.¹²
A parallel dislocation occurs when culture and ancestry are treated as interchangeable or morally neutral. Anthropology recognises culture as the medium through which meaning is transmitted and reality interpreted. To sever individuals from cultural inheritance—whether through historical erasure or ideological denial—is to weaken narrative continuity and personal coherence. Identity without memory becomes fragile; belonging without history becomes thin.¹³
Where such continuity has been forcibly disrupted, the anthropological damage is well documented. Orlando Patterson’s concept of “social death” describes the condition of persons deprived of ancestry, lineage, and historical memory. What modern liberal abstraction produces ideologically, slavery produced by violence: persons severed from the structures that make stable identity possible.¹⁴
Christian anthropology stands in direct contradiction to this vision of freedom as self-invention. Christianity is not concerned merely with the salvation of disembodied souls, nor does it promise emancipation from created reality. From its inception, the faith has insisted upon the unity of body and soul, nature and grace, time and eternity. Salvation is not the negation of humanity, but its healing and fulfilment.¹⁵
Crucially, Christian theology does not begin with the isolated individual, but with God Himself as eternal communion. The doctrine of the Trinity affirms that God is not solitary will, but eternal relational life: Father, Son, and Holy Spirit in perfect unity and distinction. Being itself, at its deepest level, is communion. Creation is not the result of divine lack, but the free extension of divine love.¹⁶
Humanity is created in the image and likeness of this God, and therefore ordered toward communion by nature. “It is not good that man should be alone” (Gen 2:18) is not merely a social observation, but a metaphysical one. Human fulfilment is relational from the beginning—expressed in sexual complementarity, family, kinship, and shared life.¹⁷
The patristic tradition consistently understands salvation as the restoration and elevation of communion. Irenaeus teaches that Christ recapitulates humanity by reuniting what was fractured by sin—man with God and man with man. Augustine likewise insists that sin curves man inward upon himself, while grace restores him to God and neighbour. Sin isolates; grace reunites.¹⁸
From this perspective, the opposition between freedom and constraint collapses. Freedom is not the power to redefine reality, but the capacity to live rightly within it. Constraint aligned with truth is not oppressive but enabling, because it situates the person within relationships that reflect the divine life itself. Freedom finds its fulfilment not in autonomy, but in participation.¹⁹
The modern crisis of freedom is therefore also a crisis of communion. A civilisation that teaches its members to resent dependence, inheritance, and obligation should not be surprised when it produces isolation, instability, and despair. Man cannot flourish in solitude, because he is not created for solitude.²⁰
Christianity offers a corrective precisely because it affirms the whole human person. It concerns man in this life and in the next—his body and soul, his history and destiny, his relationships and his eternal end. Salvation is not merely individual rescue, but incorporation into divine and human communion. The particular is not erased, but gathered; freedom is not diminished, but fulfilled.²¹
Charles Taylor, The Ethics of Authenticity (Harvard University Press, 1992).
John Locke, Second Treatise of Government, §§4–15.
Isaiah Berlin, “Two Concepts of Liberty,” in Four Essays on Liberty (Oxford University Press, 1969).
Philip Rieff, The Triumph of the Therapeutic (University of Chicago Press, 1966).
Robert D. Putnam, Bowling Alone (Simon & Schuster, 2000).
Jean M. Twenge et al., “Age, Period, and Cohort Trends in Mood Disorder Indicators,” Journal of Abnormal Psychology 128 (2019).
Joseph Henrich, The WEIRDest People in the World (Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2020); Sarah Blaffer Hrdy, Mothers and Others (Harvard University Press, 2009).
Diana Baumrind, “Child Care Practices Anteceding Three Patterns of Preschool Behavior,” Genetic Psychology Monographs 75 (1967); Laurence Steinberg, Age of Opportunity (Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2014).
American Psychiatric Association, DSM-5-TR (2022), Introduction; Jonathan Haidt & Greg Lukianoff, The Coddling of the American Mind (Penguin, 2018).
Robin Fox, Kinship and Marriage (Cambridge University Press, 1967); Christopher Boehm, Hierarchy in the Forest (Harvard University Press, 1999).
Aristotle, Politics, I.2, 1253a.
Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, I, q.92; I–II, q.94.
Clifford Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures (Basic Books, 1973).
Orlando Patterson, Slavery and Social Death (Harvard University Press, 1982).
Gaudium et Spes, §§14–15 (for continuity with perennial anthropology).
Augustine, De Trinitate, Books I–IV.
Genesis 2:18; Augustine, De Genesi ad Litteram, IX.
Irenaeus, Adversus Haereses, III.18–22; Augustine, Confessiones, XIII.
Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, I–II, q.90–94; q.17–18.
Zygmunt Bauman, Liquid Modernity (Polity Press, 2000).
Augustine, De Civitate Dei, XIX; Pius XII, Summi Pontificatus, §§27–29.
